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Allocative Efficiency and Traders’ Protection
Under Zero Intelligence Behavior
Marco LiCalzi, Lucia Milone, and Paolo Pellizzari
Abstract This paper studies the continuous double auction from the point of view
of market engineering: we tweak a resampling rule often used for this exchange
protocol and search for an improved design. We assume zero intelligence trading
as a lower bound for more robust behavioral rules and look at allocative efficiency,
as well as three subordinate performance criteria: mean spread, cancellation rate,
and traders’ protection. This latter notion measures the ability of a protocol to help
traders capture their share of the competitive equilibrium profits.
We consider two families of resampling rules and obtain the following results.
Full resampling is not necessary to attain high allocative efficiency, but fine-tuning
the resampling rate is important. The best allocative performances are similar across
the two families. However, if the market designer adds any of the other three criteria
as a subordinate goal, then a resampling rule based on a price band around the best
quotes is superior.
1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Gode and Sunder (1993a) define a zero intelligence (ZI) trader
as an agent that “has no intelligence, does not seek or maximize profits, and does
not observe, remember or learn.” (p. 121) Such zero intelligence assumption is not
meant to provide a descriptive model of individual behavior: on the contrary, it is
used to instantiate severe cognitive limitations that should impede the overall per-
formance of the market.
A ZI agent is usually modeled as a robot player that submits random offers in
an exchange market, under a minimal assumption of individual rationality: he never
takes actions that can lead him to trade at prices below his cost or above his valua-
tion. To the best of our knowledge, the first (unnamed) use of individually rational
zero intelligence behavior in economic theory goes back to the B-process studied
in Hurwicz et al. (1975); they prove that, if the market protocol allows unlimited
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retrading, an economy without externalities must converge to a Pareto optimal al-
location. Throughout this paper, we take the postulate of individual rationality for
granted and speak simply of zero intelligence behavior.
By simulating the actions of (individually rational) ZI traders in a continuous
double auction, Gode and Sunder (1993a) achieved levels of allocative efficiency
similar to the outcomes generated by human subjects in laboratory experiments.
This was used to argue that the main feature leading to a high allocative efficiency is
the market protocol rather than the trading strategies used by the agents. More boldly
put, the market can substitute for the cognitive limitations of the individuals. This
conclusion has spawned a large literature venturing in different directions, including
experimental economics and computer science; see Duffy (2006) for a thorough
survey.
In general, it is widely acknowledged that the interpretation of Gode and Sun-
der’s results is controversial. Gjerstad and Shachat (2007) emphasize the role of
individual rationality as the key crucial assumption for allocative efficiency. A re-
current theme is the robustness of Gode and Sunder’s conclusion: it is not difficult
to produce environments where the allocative efficiency reached by ZI agents badly
underperforms humans’ results; see e.g. Brewer et al. (2002). On the other hand,
the literature has shown that even minor improvements to the basic ZI trading rules
suffice to achieve convergence to the competitive equilibrium; see Cliff and Bruten
(1997) or Crockett et al. (2008).
Clearly, humans’ cognitive abilities provide more leverage than zero intelligence.
Therefore, we do not expect that the performance of a market protocol in an envi-
ronment populated with ZI agents would be the same as with human traders. On
the other hand, it is not unreasonable to postulate that the performance of a mar-
ket protocol under a ZI behavioral assumption provides a plausible benchmark for
its evaluation in view of use by human subjects. In his recent discussion of the
“market-centered theory of computational economics”, Mirowski (2007) attributes
to the zero intelligence literature the computational insight that human cognitive
abilities can be ignored under controlled circumstances to focus on the causal ca-
pacities of the market protocols. In a similar vein, Sunder (2004, p. 521) states that
“[w]hen seen as human artifacts, a science of markets need not be built from the
science of individual behavior.” The implicit claim is that we may learn about the
properties of markets regardless of the agents operating in them.
Our viewpoint is the following. Market protocols are complex artifacts; see Sub-
rahmanian and Talukdar (2004). Their design requires a special attention to details
and minutiæ that partakes of the engineering attitude advocated in Roth (2002): we
need to complement theory with experiments and computational simulations. In or-
der to make fine-grained comparisons among different protocols, it is necessary to
pin down agents’ behavior to a simple standard. The ZI assumption provides a rough
simplification under which it is possible to evaluate markets protocols in silico in or-
der to select more promising designs.
The purpose of this paper is to exemplify this approach with regard to the contin-
uous double auction. We replicate the results produced in Gode and Sunder (1993a)
and show that they depend crucially on a subtle assumption about the market pro-
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tocol that has gone unnoticed in the literature. They write: “There are several varia-
tions of the double auction. We made three choices to simplify our implementation
of the double auction. Each bid, ask, and transaction was valid for a single unit.
A transaction canceled any unaccepted bids and offers. Finally, when a bid and
a ask crossed, the transaction price was equal to the earlier of the two.” (p. 122,
emphasis added). As discussed below, the second emphasized assumption forces a
frequent resampling of agents’ quotes that is crucial (under zero intelligence) for
allocative efficiency. We call this assumption full resampling: speaking figuratively,
it mandates to toss away the book after each transaction. This seems both unrealistic
and unpalatable for practical market design.
We are thus left to ask whether Gode and Sunder’s implementation of the con-
tinuous double auction is a promising design. Taking the viewpoint of a market
designer who is interested in allocative efficiency, we evaluate alternative market
protocols that enforce different degrees of resampling. As it turns out, the assump-
tion of full resampling is not necessary to achieve very high allocative efficiency un-
der zero intelligence. There is a continuum of protocols, ordered by the strength of
their resampling properties, that attain comparable levels of efficiency. This makes
it possible to search for more effective protocols than Gode and Sunder’s (1993a)
without renouncing the objective of allocative efficiency.
To refine our selection, we introduce a subordinate criterion. While allocative
efficiency is desirable from an aggregate point of view, a single trader in an exchange
market is likely to be more interested in getting a fair deal. Let the competitive
share of a trader be the profit he would make by transacting at the (competitive)
equilibrium price. A market protocol that is more effective in helping traders realize
their competitive share offers a superior traders’ protection. Therefore, we study
the traders’ protection offered by comparably efficient market protocols to devise a
practical and simple implementation of the continuous double auction.
We study two families of resampling rules and identify a design that delivers a
significant improvement over Gode and Sunder’s (1993a). However, barring an ex-
perimental validation with human subjects, we can only claim that the lower bounds
on its performance with regard to both allocative efficiency and traders’ protection
are higher under zero intelligence.
The organization of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the model
used in our computational experiments and clarifies some technical details in the
implementation of Gode and Sunder’s (1993a) continuous double auction. The zero
intelligence assumption is maintained throughout the paper. Section 3 proves that
some (possibly not full) resampling is a necessary condition for allocative efficiency
in the continuous double auction; see also LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2008). Section 4
shows that partial resampling may be sufficient for allocative efficiency. Based on
this result, we study a family of resampling rules for the implementation of the
continuous double auction protocol that modulates the probability of clearing the
book after a transaction. Several rules within this family attain comparable levels of
allocative efficiencies. Section 5 introduces an alternative way to effect resampling
that is based on the use of a price band. Section 6 compares the alternatives and
argues that the second method delivers a better protocol. Section 7 recapitulates our
conclusions.
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2 The Model
We use a setup very similar1 to Gode and Sunder (1993a), who consider a simple
exchange economy. Following Smith (1982), we identify three distinct components
for our (simulated) exchange markets. The environment in Sect. 2.1 describes the
general characteristics of our simulated economy, including agents’ preferences and
endowments. Section 2.2 specifies how agents make decisions and take actions un-
der the zero intelligence assumption. This behavioral rule is kept fixed throughout
this paper to let us concentrate on the effects of tweaking the market design. Finally,
Sect. 2.3 gives a detailed description of the institutional details that form the proto-
col of a continuous double auction (and its variants) which regulate the exchange.
2.1 The Environment
There is an economy with a number n of traders, who can exchange single units
of a generic good. (We set n = 40,200,1000 to look at size effects.) Each agent is
initialized to be a seller or a buyer with equal probability. Each seller i is endowed
with one unit of the good for which he has a private cost ci that is independently
drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. Each buyer j holds no units and has
a private valuation vj for one unit of the good that is independently drawn from the
uniform distribution on [0,1]. Without loss of generality, prices are assumed to lie
in [0,1].
2.2 Zero Intelligence Behavior
Zero intelligence reduces behavior to a very simple rule: when requested a quote
for an order, a trader draws a price from a random distribution (usually taken to be
uniform). We assume that traders’ behavior abides by individual rationality: each
seller i is willing to sell his unit at a price p ≥ ci and each buyer j is willing to buy
one unit at a price p ≤ vj . Therefore, throughout this paper, the zero intelligence
assumption pins down behavior as follows: when requested a quote for an order,
a seller i provides an ask price that is an independent draw from the uniform distri-
bution on [ci,1]; similarly, a buyer j makes a bid that is an independent draw from
the uniform distribution on [0, vj ]. This behavioral rule is called ZI-C in Gode and
Sunder (1993a).
Note that the only action requested by an agent is to issue a quote: it is left
to the market to process traders’ quotes and execute transactions on their behalf.
1There are negligible differences. We consider n agents who can trade at most one unit, while
they have 12 traders who can exchange several units but must trade them one by one. Our setup is
simpler to describe because it associates with each trader a single unit and a one-dimensional type
(his cost/valuation).
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This is consistent with an approach of market engineering: we are not interested in
the performance of more sophisticated behavioral rules, but rather in the design of
protocols that take decent care even of simple-minded agents.
In particular, this paper studies protocols that implement variants of the con-
tinuous double auction, where agents sequentially place quotes on the selling and
buying books. Orders are immediately executed at the outstanding price if they are
marketable; otherwise, they are recorded on the books with the usual price-time pri-
ority and remain valid unless a cancellation occurs. When a transaction takes place,
the orders are removed from the market and the traders leave the market and become
inactive.
The zero intelligence assumption places a second restriction on agents’ behavior.
In a sequential protocol like the continuous double auction, an agent can choose
both his action and the time at which to take it; see Gul and Lundholm (1995). Zero
intelligence robs agents of the opportunity to make decisions about the timing at
which to issue a quote. Agents are exogenously arranged in a queue and reach the
market one at a time, until the queue is exhausted or some exogenous event triggers
the formation of a new queue.
The standard implementation is the following. At the beginning of a simulation,
all agents are active and placed in the queue. If an agent reaches the market and
trades his unit, he becomes inactive for the rest of the simulation. Otherwise, he is
in one of two states: either he has an order on the book (because he is active and
the queue has already reached him), or he is still queueing for a chance to act. An
important detail in the design of an experiment is the set of events that triggers the
formation of a new queue, reshuffling the state of active agents. For instance, the
full resampling assumption in Gode and Sunder (1993a) makes each transaction a
trigger event that sends all traders with an order on the book back to the end of the
queue.
2.3 The Protocol
The implementation of the continuous double auction in Gode and Sunder (1993a)
is based on several rules. Some of them are not stated explicitly in the paper, but
may be gathered by a joint reading of other related papers; see in particular Gode
and Sunder (1993b, 2004). For completeness and ease of reference, we collect here
all the ingredients we found necessary to replicate their results.
The first three rules correspond to the assumptions cited above. We begin with
the first and the third. The single unit rule states that all quotes and prices refer to
one unit of the good. A standard rule of precedence decides the transaction price:
when two quotes cross, the price is set by the earlier quote. We maintain both the
single unit and the precedence rules, because they entail no loss of generality.
The second of the three assumptions put forth in Gode and Sunder (1993a) as
“simplifications” states that the book is cleared after each transaction. By itself, this
rule is surprising because tossing away the book at any opportunity seems to run
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contrary to the obvious purpose of storing past orders and make them available to
future traders. In Gode and Sunder’s design, moreover, this rule triggers a refreshing
of the queue: after each transaction, all recorded orders are deleted and their owners
are given a new chance to act. When a ZI agent goes back to the queue and comes
up again, he randomly issues a new quote. Hence, the real consequence of tossing
away the book is to free up the agents’ past quotes and force them to issue novel
ones. That is, after each trade, all active agents who have placed an order since the
former transaction are resampled. This is the reason for calling their assumption full
resampling. Section 3 shows that full resampling is crucial for Gode and Sunder’s
results and hence cannot be dismissed as a mere “simplification”. In fact, one of the
motivations for this paper is to study the import of this neglected assumption.
There are other rules that need to be made explicit. No retrading states that buy-
ers and sellers can never exchange roles: a buyer (seller) who acquires (transfers)
a unit is not allowed to sell (buy) it later to other traders. The intuition that, given
sufficient retrading, a market populated with ZI agents should reach full allocative
efficiency is proven in Hurwicz et al. (1975). Therefore, no retrading is necessary
to avoid trivialities. Gode and Sunder (2004) provide further comments on the role
and plausibility of this assumption.
The uniform sequencing of agents within a simulation arranges them in a queue
according to an exogenously given order, which is independently drawn from the
uniform distribution over all permutations of agents. As explained in Gode and
Sunder (2004), in their simulations the queue of traders is sampled without replace-
ment. That is, when the execution of a transaction triggers a refreshing of the queue,
the agents who have a quote stored on the book re-enter it behind the traders still
waiting in the original queue. The no replacement assumption is a sensible simpli-
fication that allows for faster and more efficient coding. However, since this rule
violates anonymity, its practical implementation requires either additional informa-
tion processing (when control is centralized) or some traders’ coordination (under
decentralization). Therefore, in the interest of simplicity and realism, we maintain
the uniform sequencing rule but we switch to sampling with replacement: when an
event triggers the formation of a queue, we simply apply uniform sequencing over
all active agents.
Finally, the halting rule mandates when a trading session is over. In Gode and
Sunder (1993a) a trading session is a period of fixed duration that lasts 30 sec-
onds for each computational simulation. Traders are put in a queue and asked to
provide a quote. If all the queued agents have issued a quote and no transaction
has occurred, the books are cleared and a new queue is started until time is over.
Given that robot players are remarkably fast, this implies that an agent is likely to be
asked to issue a quote several times. (We have been unable to determine how often
queues are restarted in Gode and Sunder (1993a) only because the time limit has not
been reached.) Unfortunately, given that hardware (and software) vary in processing
power (and efficiency), a halting rule based on a fixed duration is not sufficient to
ensure comparable results when simulations are run on different machines. There-
fore, we choose a different halting rule that allows for full comparability: a trading
session is over when the queue of traders waiting to place an order is exhausted.
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An additional advantage of this assumption is that it biases our simulations in the
proper direction: ceteris paribus, we resample traders less often because our halting
rule is more stringent. This makes allocative efficiency harder to attain.
For the reader’s convenience, we recap here the rules of the continuous double
auction protocol used in all the simulations discussed in this paper. We use single
unit trading, set the transaction price by precedence, exclude retrading, and apply
uniform sequencing. Differently from Gode and Sunder (1993a), we put traders back
in the queue with replacement and use a more restrictive halting rule.
3 The Resampling Assumption
We test the import of the resampling assumption for the allocative efficiency of
the continuous double auction (as implemented by our protocol). As usual, we de-
fine allocative efficiency as the ratio between the realized gains from the trade and
the maximum feasible gains from trade, which can be formally defined as done in
Zhan et al. (2002, p. 678). This measure is adimensional, facilitating comparisons
throughout the paper.
3.1 Resampling Is Necessary for Allocative Efficiency
We contrast full resampling against no resampling under zero intelligence trading.
Full resampling mandates that after each transaction the book is cleared and active
traders with an order on the book are sent back to the waiting queue. No resampling
postulates that submitted orders stay on the book until the end of the trading session
(unless they are used up for a transaction); e.g. see Maslov (2000).
The difference between full and no resampling is stark. A ZI agent acts only
when its turn in the waiting queue comes up. Under no resampling, each agent
is given only one chance to act by sending a random quote to the book. Under
full resampling, on the other hand, until an agent completes a trade and becomes
inactive, any refresh of the waiting queue following a transaction may give him
a new chance to act and generate another random quote. Therefore, the number
of opportunities for actions is much greater under full resampling, and this should
increase allocative efficiency.
The datapoints on the left-hand side of Fig. 1 represent the allocative efficiencies
under full resampling for 500 different runs with n = 200 agents. The data match
Gode and Sunder’s (1993a) results, confirming that the impact of our (more strin-
gent) halting rule on allocative efficiency is negligible. The right-hand side provides
analogous information for the case of no resampling. The y-axes use the same scale,
so that a direct comparison by visual inspection is immediate: the higher the level,
the higher the allocative efficiency.
The difference in performance under full or no resampling is remarkably sub-
stantial. The mean (median) allocative efficiency is 0.910 (0.916) with full resam-
pling and 0.497 (0.498) with no resampling. (All statistics reported in this paper
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Fig. 1 Allocative efficiency under full (left) or no resampling (right)
are rounded to the closest third decimal digit.) The min–max range (standard de-
viation) for the allocative efficiency is [0.759,0.978] (0.036) with full resampling
and [0.246,0.684] (0.070) with no resampling. Within our sample, the worst alloca-
tive efficiency with n = 200 agents under full resampling (0.759) is much higher
than the best allocative efficiency under no resampling (0.684). Visual inspection
strongly suggests that the distribution of the allocative efficiency under full resam-
pling stochastically dominates the distribution under no resampling.2 More mod-
estly, we claim that the expected value of the allocative efficiency under full resam-
pling is higher. In fact, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the hypothesis that the
means are equal at a level of significance of 10−3. (Throughout the rest of the paper,
unless otherwise noted, we use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare means
and we require a p-value lower than 10−3 to claim statistical significance.)
Similar effects occur for different values of n, but a larger number of agents tends
to improve allocative efficiency. Thus, when comparing data for a different number
of agents, we should take into account a fixed size effect. We believe that n = 200
is a representative case, but for comparability Table 1 lists the main statistics for
n = 200/5 = 40 and n = 200 × 5 = 1000.
Based on the relative size of the agents’ pool, we say that the market is thin
(n = 40), thick (n = 200), or crowded (n = 1000). Each column summarizes 500
distinct simulation rounds.
It is apparent that no resampling may be calamitous in a thin market, because
an agent who happens to issue a “wrong” quote is given no later chance to remedy.
Analogously, a few “lucky” trades may shoot allocative efficiency up. Hence, the
dispersion of the allocative efficiency is much higher in a thin market. Such effects
are washed out in a crowded market. Overall, an increase in n has a positive effect
on allocative efficiency under either resampling assumption. But the effect is sharper
under full resampling, because this rule gives traders more chances to trade.
2LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2008) document a similar effect over four different trading protocols.
Allocative Efficiency and Traders’ Protection Under Zero Intelligence Behavior 13
Table 1 Summary statistics for the allocative efficiency
Full resampling No resampling
n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000 n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000
Mean 0.735 0.910 0.949 0.441 0.497 0.517
Median 0.765 0.916 0.951 0.456 0.498 0.518
Minimum 0.053 0.759 0.911 0.000 0.246 0.405
Maximum 1.000 0.978 0.971 0.933 0.684 0.609
Std. dev. 0.169 0.036 0.009 0.157 0.070 0.032
Our experiment shows that, ceteris paribus, full resampling yields a much
higher allocative efficiency than no resampling. Speaking figuratively, no resam-
pling switches off the ability of a protocol to help ZI agents capture most of the
available gains from trade. We conclude that (at least some) resampling is a neces-
sary condition for allocative efficiency. This reduces the scope of Gode and Sunder’s
(1993a) results about the ability of a market to substitute for agents’ lack of ratio-
nality: an effective protocol for ZI agents must include rules that ensure an adequate
amount of resampling.
On the other hand, our results do not invalidate their claim that it is possible to
design markets that may overcome agents’ cognitive limitations. To the contrary,
they suggest that the use of a (partial) resampling rule may be a particularly clever
design choice for fostering allocative efficiency in exchange markets. Section 4 sets
out to examine a continuum of alternative rules that enforce different degrees of
resampling in this respect. We find that less than full resampling is sufficient to
reach high levels of efficiency.
3.2 Efficiency and Full Resampling
Before moving to issues of market engineering, there are two hanging questions to
address. First: why does full resampling lead to higher allocative efficiency than no
resampling? Second: where does the efficiency loss go?
We begin with the second question, whose answer leads naturally to the first one.
Gode and Sunder (1997, p. 605) point out that in general there are “three causes of
inefficiency: (1) traders participate in unprofitable trades; (2) traders fail to negoti-
ate profitable trades’ and (3) extramarginal traders displace intramarginal traders.”
Since individual rationality rules out the first source of inefficiency, we need be-
ing concerned only with the other two. They can be measured; e.g., see Zhan and
Friedman (2007) who also provide formal definitions.
Let p∗ be the market-clearing price. (There may be an interval of market-clearing
prices. We assume that p∗ is the midpoint.) Individually rational traders who would
transact at p∗ are called intramarginal; all other traders are extramarginal. If at the
end of a trading session an intramarginal trader i has failed to trade, this creates a
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Table 2 A breakdown of the efficiency loss
Full resampling No resampling
n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000 n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000
AE 0.735 0.910 0.950 0.441 0.497 0.517
MT 0.241 0.055 0.012 0.548 0.495 0.477
EM 0.025 0.035 0.037 0.011 0.008 0.006
loss of total surplus equal to vi − p∗ if he is a buyer and p∗ − ci if he is a seller.
The sum of these losses corresponds to (2) above: we call it MT , as a mnemonic
for the inefficiency caused by missed trades. The third case comes about when a
transaction involves an extramarginal trader, causing a loss equal to his profit at p∗.
The sum of such losses corresponds to (3) above: we call it EM, as a mnemonic for
the inefficiency due to extramarginal trades. As discussed in Zhan and Friedman
(2007), the allocative efficiency decomposes as AE = 1 − MT − EM; or, equiva-
lently, MT + EM = 1 − AE measures the allocative inefficiency. Table 2 provides a
breakdown of the efficiency loss for thin, thick and crowded markets by listing mean
values over 500 distinct simulation rounds. Values may not add up to 1 because of
rounding effects.
There are two observations to be made. The first one is that the efficiency loss
(MT) attributable to missed trades is decreasing in the thickness of the market, be-
cause thicker markets facilitate the search for a matching quote. Moreover, trading
under no resampling terminates too soon: most of the efficiency loss comes from
missed trades. (The difference between the mean values for MT under full or no
resampling is statistically significant.) The reason for a high allocative efficiency
under full resampling is elementary: this rule is of course more effective in prolong-
ing the trading session, and hence gives traders enough chances to find their right
match. This suggests that an effective market protocol should offer agents an ade-
quate number of matching opportunities to keep the MT component of the efficiency
loss under control.
The second observation points out a shortcoming of full resampling. The aver-
age value of EM is higher under such rule. (The difference between the means is
once again statistically significant.) This is not difficult to explain: by the prece-
dence rule, the best outstanding bid and ask in the book bound the price of the
next transaction. The narrower the spread, the more difficult is to steal a deal for
an extramarginal trader. Storing earlier quotes in the book provides (intramarginal)
traders with some price protection and makes them less exploitable by extramarginal
agents. As the full resampling rule tosses away the book after each transaction, it re-
nounces such protection all too frequently (compared to no resampling). This is ap-
parent by a straightforward comparison: the average spread (sampled before a trader
places an order) is 0.152 with no resampling and 0.327 with full resampling when
n = 200. (Corresponding values are 0.267 and 0.398 for n = 40; 0.113 and 0.268
for n = 1000.) The differences between the mean values are statistically significant.
Since the zero intelligence assumption prevents traders from adjusting their quotes
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Fig. 2 Allocative efficiency under π -resampling
based on the state of the book, full resampling is a rule more favorable to extra-
marginal traders than no resampling. This suggests that an effective market protocol
should incorporate some form of price protection to keep the EM component of the
efficiency loss under control.
4 Randomized Resampling
Section 3.1 established that the resampling rule is crucial to reach allocative effi-
ciency under zero intelligence. To evaluate its impact, this section begins by looking
at a continuum of resampling rules that generalize the simple dichotomy between no
and full resampling. We emphasize that these rules are chosen to compare and under-
stand how resampling affects the trading protocol. Like engineers, we are searching
for improvements and tweaks over a basic design.
4.1 Full Resampling Is Not Necessary for Allocative Efficiency
A simple way to conceptualize the distinction between no and full resampling is
to note that these two rules react differently to the same event; namely, the occur-
rence of a transaction. When two orders cross, full resampling clears the book with
probability one whereas no resampling does so with probability zero. This naturally
suggests to consider a family of randomized resampling rules that clear the book
with probability π in [0,1] whenever there is a transaction. This set embeds full
resampling for π = 1 and no resampling for π = 0.
The right-hand side of Fig. 2 shows the allocative efficiency under π -resampling
with n = 200 agents. The graph is obtained as follows. We choose the 21 equis-
paced points {0,0.05,0.10, . . . ,0.90,0.95,1} in the [0,1] interval. For each of these
π -values, we run 500 distinct simulations. The allocative efficiencies obtained over
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these 21 × 500 = 10500 simulations are plotted as datapoints on the left-hand side
of Fig. 2. We summarize these data by the mean allocative efficiency for each π .
(The difference between a mean and the corresponding median is never greater than
0.022.) The 21 sample averages are joined using segments to obtain the thicker
central piecewise linear representation.3 The two external thin graphs are similarly
obtained by joining respectively the minimum and maximum values obtained for
the allocative efficiency at a given value of the resampling probability π . We em-
phasize that the resulting band is not a confidence interval but the actual range of
efficiencies obtained under our simulations: its main purpose is to provide a simple
visual diagnostic for the dispersion of the data around their central tendency. We
adopt the usual [0,1]-scale for the y-axis.
The graph on the right of Fig. 2 is easily interpreted. As expected, allocative
efficiency is on average increasing in the probability π that a transaction triggers a
clearing of the book. Under zero intelligence, the frequency with which resampling
takes place has a direct effect on the ability of the protocol to reap high levels of
efficiency. On the other hand, the graph shows also that full resampling (π = 1) is
not necessary: the (average) allocative efficiency in our simulations is more than
90% for π ≥ 0.7 with a (statistically insignificant) peak of 91.08% at π = 0.95;
the standard deviations are never greater than 0.132. There is an upper bound on
the allocative efficiency that can be attained but a sufficiently large π is enough to
approach it.
Similar results hold for thin and crowded markets: when n = 40, AE ≥ 67% for
π ≥ 0.7 with a peak of 73.48% at π = 1 and standard deviations never greater than
0.209; when n = 1000, AE ≥ 93% for π ≥ 0.2 with a (statistically insignificant)
peak of 95.12% at π = 0.85 and standard deviations never greater than 0.080. The
thickness of the market affects the upper bound on the allocative efficiency but, in
general, there is a whole range of resampling probabilities that achieve comparably
high levels of allocative efficiency under zero intelligence.
Our conclusion is that full resampling is not necessary for allocative efficiency.
Full resampling sets π = 1 and tosses the book away after each transaction: this
yields a high allocative efficiency under zero intelligence, but it is also an extreme
assumption that is likely to be unpalatable for human traders in real markets. As it
turns out, we can temper the strength of full resampling at the mere cost of a tiny
reduction (if any) in allocative efficiency.
This leads naturally to frame the choice of a resampling rule as a tradeoff be-
tween its allocative benefits and its implementation costs. On the part of the market
designer, there are obvious costs to continuously monitor and update the state of the
book. Similarly, traders who are forced to check whether their past orders have been
voided are likely to resist frequent cancellations. Intuitively, when the costs of full
resampling are not trivial, we expect partial resampling (0 < π < 1) to be prefer-
able. The rest of this section fleshes up this argument. Section 5 takes up a related
3We consistently apply this approach to construct the graphs for this paper: a broken line joins
21 points, each of which represents a statistic over 500 distinct simulations for a fixed value of a
parameter such as π .
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question and examines a different family of resampling rules to find out whether
they perform better than π -resampling.
4.2 Where Is the Best π?
Let us take stock of the starting point we have reached so far. First, given the thick-
ness of the market, there is an upper bound on the (mean) allocative efficiency that
can be attained using π -resampling. Second, the set of π -values for which the pro-
tocol reaches comparably high levels of efficiency is an interval. Thus, we need to
look at additional performance criteria in order to pinpoint a smaller interval for the
choice for π .
We do not claim that it is possible to find the best π and reduce such interval
to a singleton, because the zero intelligence assumption provides at best a lower
bound for the evaluation of a protocol. More modestly, we can define plausible per-
formance criteria and measure them for different values of π under zero intelligence
trading. Clearly, this procedure cannot provide a final verdict for the performance
of the protocol with human subjects. Hence, the aim of this section is to carry out
an engineering exercise and derive a robust choice: what is the range of π for which
performance under zero intelligence is better, and why?
We consider two simple criteria. (Others are of course possible, and we take up a
third major one in Sect. 4.3.) The first criterion deals with the basic requirement that
an effective market protocol should offer some guidance to traders’ choice in the
form of a price signal. The closer the outstanding bid and ask straddle the (compet-
itive) equilibrium price, the stronger the information that they provide. It is obvious
that zero intelligence makes no use of this information: therefore, the object of our
investigation is the ability of the protocol to provide an effective price signal inde-
pendently of traders’ behavior.
We measure it by the (mean) spread on the market: the closer the spread, the
stronger the signal. The average is taken by sampling data when a trader arrives
and places an order (as opposed to just before a transaction occurs), because we are
interested in the state of the book found by a generic agent reaching the market. As
it turns out, our environment is sufficiently regular that the best bid and the best ask
are (on average) symmetric around the equilibrium price p∗. Hence, the outstanding
spread is a sufficient statistic for such purpose. The left-hand side of Fig. 3 shows
the (mean) outstanding bid and ask under π -resampling. The y-axis is truncated to
[0.3,0.7] to enhance readability.
Unsurprisingly, the spread is on average increasing in π . When resampling is
more frequent, the book is cleared more often and hence is more likely to have
both fewer quotes and a larger spread. For n = 200, the average (median) spread
in our simulations increases monotonically from 0.152 (0.124) at π = 0 to a peak
of 0.327 (0.232) at π = 1; the standard deviations are never greater than 0.033.
Qualitatively similar results hold for n = 40 and n = 1000, and spreads are smaller
in thicker markets. This leads to the following general piece of advice. Suppose
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Fig. 3 Mean spreads and cancellation rates under π -resampling
that, conditional on achieving comparable levels of allocative efficiency, a market
designer prefers narrower spreads. Then he should aim towards choosing a level of
π that is bounded away from zero (to achieve efficiency) as well as from one (to
obtain smaller spreads). The thicker the market, the weaker the need to stay away
from one.
A second simple criterion has to do with the number of cancellations imposed on
traders. (Recall that traders cannot cancel their orders.) The benefit of a cancellation
is to offer a new chance for action to the trader. On the other hand, in general there
are costs associated with the inconvenience of monitoring the state of an order or
placing a new one. Therefore, when the allocative efficiency of two protocols are
similar, it is reasonable to expect that the one leading to fewer cancellations should
be preferred. We measure the cancellation rate as the average of the ratio between
the number of orders canceled over the number of transactions completed over each
of our 500 simulated trading sessions. Clearly, allocative efficiency is strongly cor-
related with volume; hence, the higher the ratio, the higher the cost of redundant
cancellations. The right-hand side of Fig. 3 depicts the (mean) cancellation ratio
with n = 200 agents. As usual, we report the mean values as a thick black line
surrounded by thinner red lines that correspond to the minima and maxima.
Similarly to the spread, the cancellation rate is on average increasing in π be-
cause the amount of resampling directly correlates with the number of canceled
orders. For n = 200, the mean (and standard deviation) of the cancellation rate go
up4 from 2.643 (2.498) at π = 0.05 to a peak of 18.22 (3.002) at π = 1; the stan-
dard deviations are never greater than 3.124. Similar results hold for n = 40 and
n = 1000, and mean cancellation rates are higher in thicker markets. The conclu-
sion we draw is similar to the earlier one. Suppose that, conditional on achieving
comparable levels of allocative efficiency, a market designer prefers a lower cancel-
lation rate. Then an optimal π should be bounded away from zero (for efficiency)
4We start from π = 0.05 because the cancellation rate at π = 0 is zero by assumption.
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as well as from one (for a lower rate). The thicker the market, the stronger the need
to stay away from one.
4.3 Traders’ Protection
The last performance criterion that we consider in this paper is directly inspired by
Stigler (1964), who pioneered the use of simulations to address issues of market
engineering. He put down a clear statement: “The paramount goal of the regulations
in the security markets is to protect the innocent (but avaricious) investor” (p. 120).
While his paper is concerned with security markets, the conditions for achieving
this goal should also be investigated for exchange markets. Curiously, the literature
on zero intelligence has so far neglected this issue to the point that there is not even
an agreed convention on the exact meaning of protection.
This section provides a measurable criterion for traders’ protection in an ex-
change market, and then applies it to the evaluation of the π -resampling rule. Ide-
ally, in a competitive equilibrium, all5 the intramarginal traders exchange the good at
the same equilibrium price p∗: nobody pays (or is paid) differently from the others.
On the other hand, a continuous double auction offers neither of these guarantees:
first, an intramarginal trader may fail to close a deal; second, the price at which a
trade occurs may be different from the price agreed for another trade. Both of these
events deny the competitive outcome to the intramarginal trader. When a market
protocol hold such events under control, it manages to offer traders’ protection.
Clearly, allocative efficiency does not measure traders’ protection: since it fo-
cuses on the gains from trade that are realized, it fails to register at what terms these
gains materialize. We need a more sophisticated measure that takes into account the
price at which a transaction is carried out, and hence touches on the distribution of
gains. To this purpose, we define the competitive share of a trader as the (positive
part of the) profit he would make by transacting at the competitive equilibrium price.
Given an equilibrium price p∗, the competitive share of a buyer with valuation v is
(v−p∗)+ and that of a seller with cost c is (p∗ −c)+. Clearly, the competitive share
of any extramarginal trader is zero.
The realized competitive share is the portion of his competitive share realized
by an agent. (Extramarginal traders are entitled to no competitive share.) If an agent
fails to trade, this portion is zero. If a trade occurs at price p, the realized competitive
share is v − max{p,p∗} for an (intramarginal) buyer and min{p,p∗} − c for an
(intramarginal) seller.
The realized competitive share is concerned only with measuring whether a
trader gets its due, and ignores any additional gains that he may be able to reap. The
profit realized by an intramarginal trader may be greater than his realized competi-
tive share if he manages to secure terms of trade more favorable than p∗; similarly,
5When the number of intramarginal traders is odd, one of them will not trade for lack of a partner.
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Fig. 4 Traders’ protection (left), superimposed to allocative efficiency (right)
any extramarginal agent who completes a trade makes positive profits by individual
rationality, but his realized competitive share remains zero.
Note that the sum of all the competitive shares equals the maximum feasible
gains from trade. In analogy with allocative efficiency (AE), we define the traders’
protection (for short, TP) offered by a market protocol as the ratio of the realized
competitive shares and the sum of all the competitive shares. This measure is adi-
mensional and takes values in [0,1].
The left-hand side of Fig. 4 shows the traders’ protection under π -resampling
with n = 200 agents. As usual, we report the mean values surrounded by minima
and maxima. The right-hand side superimposes AE and TP to allow for a direct
comparison: the black line corresponding to TP is the same visible on the left, while
the red line depicting AE corresponds to the inner black line from the right-hand
side of Fig. 2.
In general, traders’ protection is not increasing in π . For n = 200, the mean
protection starts at 0.431 in π = 0, peaks at 0.718 in π = 0.7 and then declines to
0.709 in π = 1 (with two local maxima of 0.711 at π = 0.4 and 0.715 at π = 0.9);
the standard deviations are never greater than 0.111. Qualitatively similar results
hold for crowded and thin markets. When n = 1000, TP is 0.461 in π = 0, peaks at
0.791 in π = 0.2 and then declines to 0.744 in π = 1 with no other local maxima
and standard deviations never greater than 0.070. For n = 40, TP is 0.355 in π = 0
and peaks at 0.563 in π = 1, with four more local maxima in between and standard
deviations never greater than 0.172.
Here, the thickness of the market has a very strong effect on the range of the
best value for π : the more crowded the market, the smaller the resampling rate that
provides the best protection. The overall conclusion is similar to the above, with a
strong word of caution as regards the thickness of the market. Suppose that, con-
ditional on achieving comparable levels of allocative efficiency, a market designer
prefers to offer a higher traders’ protection. Then an optimal π should be bounded
away from zero (for efficiency) as well as from one (for protection). When the mar-
ket gets thicker, however, the need to stay away from one is remarkably higher.
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To sum it up, we have considered three criteria based respectively on spread,
cancellation rate, and traders’ protection. To a different extent, they all support a
choice of π from the interior of the interval [0,1]: at the cost of a nominal reduction
in allocative efficiency, it is possible to have lower spreads, fewer cancellations,
and higher traders’ protection. It is clear that both the relative importance of these
criteria to the market designer as well as the thickness of the market matter for
the exact choice of π . However, generally speaking, all of our performance criteria
strongly suggest that full resampling is unlikely to be a defensible choice.
5 Resampling Outside of a Price Band
Section 4 has studied randomized resampling, but it is obvious that there exist many
other rules. It may be impossible to pick a best one, but we can compare the per-
formance of different resampling techniques. This section considers a different rule
that shares a few basic properties with π -resampling. First, it depends on a single pa-
rameter γ in [0,1]. Second, it implies an average resampling rate that is increasing
in the parameter. Third, it embeds the two extreme cases of full and no resampling
for γ = 1 and γ = 0. Fourth, it requires minimal information and thus imposes very
little burden on the market protocol or the cognitive abilities of the traders.
The γ -resampling rule is the following. After a trade carries out at price p, the
protocol cancels all outstanding orders that fall outside the price band [γp,γp +
(1 − γ )]; moreover, in the special case γ = 1, we require the protocol to erase even
the outstanding orders at price p so that it clears the book entirely. (This specifica-
tion is necessary to embed full resampling, because the book might contain orders
with price p but lower time priority.) It is useful to keep in mind that π is the prob-
ability with which the book is cleared after a transaction, while (1 − γ ) is the width
of the price band within which orders are not deleted after a transaction.
Like π -resampling, the γ -resampling rule is triggered whenever a transaction oc-
curs. Differently from it, its application implies that traders whose orders are deleted
may infer a one-sided bound for the last transaction price. For instance, given γ ,
when a buyer sees that his past order at price p has been canceled, he can deduce
that the last transaction price must have been strictly greater than p/γ . We do not
view this a significant limitation, since it is seems highly plausible that all agents
would be given public access to such information. On the other hand, since it makes
no use of the best outstanding bid and ask, the γ -resampling rule does not require
to divulge this kind of information. This may be an additional advantage in view of
the results in Arifovic and Ledyard (2007), who consider a sequence of call markets
and show that the closed book design6 brings about a higher allocative efficiency
than an open book in environments populated with human subjects or (non ZI) sim-
ulated agents. If similar results should suggest adopting a closed book design for
6In a closed book, traders learn only the clearing price after each call; in an open book, they are
also told the quotes processed in that call.
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Fig. 5 Allocative efficiency under π - and γ -resampling
the continuous double auction, both π - and γ -resampling are compatible. For the
current study, it suffices to say that the ZI assumption precludes a direct comparison
between closed and open book design, because it prevents agents from making use
of any disclosed information.
The γ -resampling rule may be easily adapted in other dimensions. For instance,
our definition embeds a symmetry assumption that may be removed. We choose
the endpoints of the price band at the same distance from the extremes of the price
range: the left endpoint is a convex combination between the last transaction price p
and the minimum possible price, while the right endpoint is a convex combination
between p and the maximum possible price. Clearly, this choice requires the implicit
assumption that we know that p lies in the interval [0,1]. More generally, when no
bounds for the price are known, it suffices to set the price band to be the interval
[γp, (1/γ )p] for γ in [0,1] or other analogous formulations.
Figure 5 shows the allocative efficiency under π -resampling (on the left) and
γ -resampling (on the right) with n = 200 agents.
The graph on the left is the same as in Fig. 2. The graph on the right is the
analog for γ -resampling: a thick inner black line joins the mean values, and two
thin outer red lines join the corresponding minima and maxima. The directionality
of the graphs is aligned because they depict two resampling rules that coincide for
π = γ = 0 and π = γ = 1.
Both resampling rules are on average increasing in the corresponding parameter.
However, the qualitative behavior is different. Under π -resampling, allocative effi-
ciency picks up fast and rapidly settles on a plateau: for n = 200, the sample average
is greater than 0.90 for π ≥ 0.7. As already discussed, even moderate levels of π
suffice to attain an adequate level of efficiency. On the other hand, efficiency under
γ -resampling grows up more slowly and, quite interestingly, peaks at γ < 1: for
n = 200, the sample average is greater than 0.90 for π ≥ 0.75 and peaks at 0.923
for γ = 0.85; the standard deviations are never greater than 0.073.
Similar results hold for the case of thin and crowded markets. For n = 40, the
sample average is greater than 0.67 for γ ≥ 0.65 and peaks at 0.743 for γ = 0.9,
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Table 3 Maximum allocative efficiency under π - and γ -resampling
π-resampling γ -resampling
n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000 n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000
Maximum AE 0.735 0.911 0.951 0.743 0.923 0.960
Maximizer (π, γ ) 1.000 0.950 0.850 0.900 0.850 0.800
with standard deviations never greater than 0.197; for n = 1000, the sample aver-
age is greater than 0.94 for γ ≥ 0.7 and peaks at 0.96 for γ = 0.8 with standard
deviations never greater than 0.033. Thicker markets exhibit a superior allocative
performance for lower values of γ but the overall conclusion is the same: a narrow
(but not empty) price band is a necessary condition to attain sufficiently high levels
of efficiency.
6 A Comparison of Alternative Rules
This section compares the performance of the protocol when adopting π -resampling
versus γ -resampling over four different criteria: allocative efficiency (AE), mean
spread, cancellation rate, and traders’ protection (TP).
Table 3 compares the allocative efficiency under π - and γ -resampling for thin,
thick, and crowded markets.
For each combination of n and resampling rule, we list the highest mean values
obtained. These are slightly higher under γ -resampling, but we would not stake big
claims over tiny differences that are subject to sampling errors. (However, they are
statistically significant for n = 200 and n = 1000.) We prefer to conclude that there
is no clear winner over AE: both resampling rules can be tuned to attain comparably
high levels of allocative efficiency .
The second performance criterion is the mean spread. Figure 6 shows the best
bid and ask under both π -resampling (on the left) and γ -resampling (on the right)
with n = 200 agents. The y-axes are truncated to [0.3,0.7] to enhance readability.
Predictably, as a mere visual inspection confirms, the clear winner is the γ -
resampling rule that is based on an explicit form of price control. Table 4 vali-
dates this conjecture by listing the lowest mean spread obtained under π - and γ -
resampling for thin, thick, and crowded markets. The difference between the mean
values is statistically significant for each choice of n.
Conditional on choosing the right parameter, the mean spread with γ -resampling
is remarkably smaller. However, note that the best performances of both π - and γ -
resampling with regard to the mean spread require a choice of parameters that are
far from being optimal for allocative efficiency. This is easily seen by comparing
the second rows from Tables 3 and 4. Therefore, while it is clear that γ -resampling
yields a lower mean spread than π -resampling under ideal conditions, we need a
further test to find out whether it is still superior once we take into account both
efficiency and mean spread.
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Fig. 6 Mean spread under π - and γ -resampling
Table 4 Mean spread under π - and γ -resampling
π-resampling γ -resampling
n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000 n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000
Minimum (mean) spread 0.267 0.152 0.113 0.228 0.118 0.086
Minimizer (π, γ ) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.450 0.500 0.600
This test is provided on the left-hand side of Fig. 7, where we plot the average
outstanding bid and ask under both π -resampling (in red) and γ -resampling (in
black) with n = 200 agents. This graph combines information about the two resam-
pling rules. For each level of the (mean) allocative efficiency attained under either
rule, we plot the corresponding average values of the best bid and ask and then
join the datapoints using broken lines. Since the two rules attain different (mean)
efficiencies, the datapoints are not vertically aligned. The left-hand picture shows
clearly that, for comparable levels of allocative efficiency, γ -resampling leads to
smaller (mean) spreads that π -resampling. In other words, a resampling rule based
on a price band tends to produce a smaller spread than a rule based on a full clearing
of the book, without sacrificing allocative efficiency.
Our third performance criterion is the cancellation rate. As is the case for π -
resampling, this rate in on average increasing in γ because the width of the price
band inversely correlates with the number of canceled orders. For n = 200, the mean
(and standard deviation) of the cancellation rate go up from 1.868 (0.561) at γ =
0.05 (it is zero for γ = 0) to 18.16 (3.211) at γ = 1; the standard deviations are
never greater than 3.212. A direct comparison shows that the range of attainable
values for the cancellation rate is virtually identical under π - and γ -resampling.
Similar results hold for n = 40 and n = 1000. Taken by itself, therefore, a criterion
based on the cancellation rate is not conclusive.
As for the mean spread, however, we can compare the combined performance
of either resampling rule with respect to allocative efficiency and cancellation rates.
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Fig. 7 Bid-ask spreads and cancellation rates versus allocative efficiency
Table 5 Maximum traders’ protection under π - and γ -resampling
π-resampling γ -resampling
n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000 n = 40 n = 200 n = 1000
Maximum TP 0.563 0.718 0.791 0.589 0.774 0.833
Maximizer (π, γ ) 1.000 0.700 0.200 0.800 0.750 0.700
The right-hand side of Fig. 7 plots the (average) cancellation rates for each level
of the (mean) allocative efficiency attained under either rule. For a large range of
(lower) allocative efficiencies, π -resampling has a substantially lower cancellation
rate; for high values, γ -resampling comes out better by a thin margin. (We do not
report the graphs for different values of n, but increasing n makes this conclusion
sharper.) Hence, whenever the market designer views the cancellation rate as ancil-
lary to the allocative performance, he should prefer a resampling rule based on the
price band.
The last (and in our opinion, more important) criterion is traders’ protection. Ta-
ble 5 compares the performance of π - and γ -resampling in thin, thick, and crowded
markets. Similarly to Table 3, we list the highest mean values obtained for each
combination of n and resampling rule. For n = 200 or n = 1000, the differences
between the mean values are statistically significant. (For n = 40, this holds at the
1% significance level.) Conditional on choosing the right parameter, traders’ pro-
tection is higher using γ -resampling. Note also that the optimal values of π and γ
are decreasing in the thickness of the market, but this effect is much stronger for π -
resampling. Therefore, when the exact size of the market is not known, the choice
of the parameter under γ -resampling is more robust.
This superiority carries over when traders’ protection is ancillary to allocative
efficiency. The left-hand side of Fig. 8 superimposes the usual graphs of the mean
values for AE and TP under γ -resampling for n = 200. The equivalent representa-
tion for π -resampling is on the right-hand side of Fig. 4. In general, γ -resampling
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Fig. 8 Traders’ protection and allocative efficiency for π - and γ -resampling
delivers a higher traders’ protection than π -resampling for any given level of al-
locative efficiency. This is shown on the right-hand side of Fig. 8, where we report
the (mean) traders’ protection offered by the two resampling rules with respect to
their (mean) allocative efficiency. The γ -resampling frontier on the AE–TP plane
dominates the π -resampling frontier.
7 Conclusions
We have studied the continuous double auction from the point of view of market
engineering, tweaking the trading protocol in search of improved designs. Our start-
ing point has been the rules for exchange adopted by Gode and Sunder (1993a)
for experiments with human agents and simulations with robot traders. We have
disassembled their trading protocol into several component rules, and focused at-
tention on resampling. We have assumed zero intelligence trading as a lower bound
for more robust behavioral rules in order to elucidate the consequences of different
resampling techniques.
Like Gode and Sunder (1993a) and most of the subsequent literature, we look
first at allocative efficiency. Their trading protocol makes an extreme assumption
that we call full resampling. We show that full resampling is especially favorable
to allocative efficiency, biasing Gode and Sunder’s results about the ability of the
market to substitute for the lack of traders’ intelligence. (A second negligible bias
may come from their halting rule.) On the other hand, we demonstrate that partial
resampling may be sufficient for the purpose of attaining a high allocative efficiency.
Based on this, we have devised a family of rules that includes as extreme cases
both Gode and Sunder’s full resampling and the opposite assumption of no resam-
pling. This class of rules is parameterized by the probability π of clearing the book
after a transaction occurs. We find that there is a large range of values for which
π -resampling can attain a high allocative efficiency. In order to discriminate among
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such π ’s, we introduce three subordinate performance criteria: spread, cancellation
rate, and traders’ protection. The spread criterion measures the capacity of the proto-
col to provide a useful price signal. The cancellation rate looks at the inconvenience
created by over-resampling. Finally, traders’ protection measures the ability of a
protocol to help agents capture their share of the competitive equilibrium profits.
This latter criterion, patterned after the usual measure of allocative efficiency, is (to
the best of our knowledge) new to the literature: we argue that ignoring it neglects
one of the paramount goals of designing a market protocol.
We then introduce a different family of rules, based on the idea to delete only
those quotes that fall outside of a price band parameterized by γ . We find that from
the point of view of allocative efficiency, the optimized versions of either resampling
rule are virtually indistinguishable. However, several differences emerge when we
study their performance with respect to the other three criteria. In particular, when
we consider a pair of criteria where the first one is allocative efficiency and the
second one is any of the other three, we find that it is always the case that (at least
for high efficiencies) γ -resampling dominates π -resampling. We then conclude that
a resampling rule based on the price band is superior.
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